Libya 1986->2011

What is "World Music?" - Angola Soundtrack: The Unique Sound of Luanda 1968-1976

As Americans we tend to fall into an Anglo-American trap when it comes to selecting music. If music falls outside the North American – Continental European divide, it is ultimately labeled “World Music.” It is the quintessential example of why musical categorization (and genres in general) does little to aid the listener in understanding more about the music he/she is listening to.


You have to ask yourself, what is similar about Cuban and South African music? And if you cannot come up with a definitive response then it might be time to give up one’s simplistic classification attempts. We often talk about the afrobeat/afrofunk influences of Talking Heads or Vampire Weekend without really diving deeper into those influences. Not to say that Angola Soundtrack: The Unique Sound of Luanda 1968-1976 is an afrobeat album, but you get the idea. Often, I find myself reading “ he incorporates a lot of tribal influences into his drums,” or something to that effect. I don’t know what that means, but I think “tribal,” in that instance, essentially means non-western.


Having said that, you can hear Congolese psychedelic guitar influences in Angola Soundtrack, reminiscent of the rhythms popularized by Konono No 1. The music itself has a unique Angolan twist. There’s a touch of Caribbean and merengue influences. Much of Brazil’s African population came from Angola. There is noticeable resemblance in the semba music off Angola Soundtrack and the samba heard on Brazilian airwaves today. Angolan-influenced, Portuguese group Buraka Som Sistema brought kuduro, an urban take on semba, to the world. Hopefully, Angola Soundtrack will bring the world to Angola.


Much respect to Analog Africa. They make an effort to go search for the artists of these songs, wherever possible, and make sure they are paid a fair portion of the record proceeds, which has often not been the case in “African” compilation deals of the past. I know we regularly encourage you to purchase the music we post, but we especially encourage you to do so for any one of Analog Africa’s compilations. I first came across their third release African Scream Contest: Raw & Psychedelic Sounds From Benin & Togo 70s in a record shop in St. Mark’s Place. I later came across Vol. 5 Legends from Benin looking through crates at Amoeba in Hollywood.


Purchase Angola Soundtrack: The Unique Sound of Luanda 1968-1976 here.


More from Analog Africa.

Crisis Averted

What about Yemen?

Yes! What about Yemen, or any other country with violent, authoritarian regimes? What do we do with them? As with Libya, I do not wish the United States to get involved in regime change in other countries across the Levant, the Persian Gulf and Sub-Saharan and North Africa. But, one can see where laying the foundation of war on humanitarian precepts, countries arguing for action can find themselves in double-standards in other situations where they are more complacent and predisposed to inaction.

Having said that, principally, I think last week’s Economist cartoon summed up my feelings on the War in Libya (It is even quite comical that the phrase “War in Libya” is in and of itself is controversial, as if calling a war by another name, e.g. intervention, distorts the scope of the realities on the ground). My feelings being primarily that the case for intervention on humanitarian grounds in Libya and not in Syria, Iran, Bahrain, Ivory Coast or Yemen was arbitrary on a "responsibility-to-protect (R2P)" spectrum.

What the wording of the UN Security Council resolution has done is leave the US and NATO-led war against Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi and Qaddafi’s forces up for criticism based on the limits of the scope of involvement and humanitarian basis of war itself. For this reason, limiting the scope of the allied involvement for humanitarian purposes has drawn criticism from countries not involved in the intervention when juxtaposed with the overt allied rhetoric for the need of regime change in Libya.

Notably, the case for war was based off the need to prevent of a “humanitarian disaster” in Benghazi by Qaddafi’s forces. This claim was made from the dual presupposition that there was truth in the stylistic ranting by Qaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam (over various interviews where they promised to go “door-to-door” and warn of the threat of “rivers of blood,” if civil war were to ensue) and that thousands of civilians would perish at the hands of Qaddafi's retaliatory revenge against the uprisings. In last Monday’s speech, President Obama said:

"We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi – a city nearly the size of Charlotte – could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen." 

The case isn't as strong as Samantha Power, et al, would have you presume. This is not an intervention to prevent genocide, or violence on some comparable level. Invariably, it is difficult for us to judge the true merits for war given that the word 'humanitarian,' itself, is vague. Is there a threshold of deaths needed for the 'humanitarian disaster' label?  The Blaine Truth argued last month that the case was clear - the United States must protect the rebels and aid them in their overthrow of Qaddafi. This goes beyond the stated scope of the UN Security Council Resolution. In a previous post, I stated what the difficulties were with such a limited scope, but nonetheless they were necessary to build a coalition.

Although we may not like Qaddafi, although we may not want him to be in power, we are limited by the wording of the resolution - as Dr. Cordesman highlights - which is a consensus piece and not itself a diver of policy. Nevertheless, it is the basis for justification of intervention. Ultimately, what is important and what Stephen Walt highlighted is that President Obama's speech "did not matter," it is the results of the No-Fly Zone that matter. The justifications for intervention can change with time (as witnessed in Iraq), but there is only one clear rendering of the results, which remain to be seen.

References:

Marc Lynch’s article:

http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/29/the_case_against_the_libya_intervention

Stephen Walt’s article:

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/29/why_obamas_libya_speech_didnt_matter

http://csis.org/multimedia/video-anthony-cordesman-unrest-libya