Yes! What about Yemen, or any other country with violent, authoritarian regimes? What do we do with them? As with Libya, I do not wish the United States to get involved in regime change in other countries across the Levant, the Persian Gulf and Sub-Saharan and North Africa. But, one can see where laying the foundation of war on humanitarian precepts, countries arguing for action can find themselves in double-standards in other situations where they are more complacent and predisposed to inaction.
Having said that, principally, I think last week’s Economist cartoon summed up my feelings on the War in Libya (It is even quite comical that the phrase “War in Libya” is in and of itself is controversial, as if calling a war by another name, e.g. intervention, distorts the scope of the realities on the ground). My feelings being primarily that the case for intervention on humanitarian grounds in Libya and not in Syria, Iran, Bahrain, Ivory Coast or Yemen was arbitrary on a "responsibility-to-protect (R2P)" spectrum.
What the wording of the UN Security Council resolution has done is leave the US and NATO-led war against Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi and Qaddafi’s forces up for criticism based on the limits of the scope of involvement and humanitarian basis of war itself. For this reason, limiting the scope of the allied involvement for humanitarian purposes has drawn criticism from countries not involved in the intervention when juxtaposed with the overt allied rhetoric for the need of regime change in Libya.
Notably, the case for war was based off the need to prevent of a “humanitarian disaster” in Benghazi by Qaddafi’s forces. This claim was made from the dual presupposition that there was truth in the stylistic ranting by Qaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam (over various interviews where they promised to go “door-to-door” and warn of the threat of “rivers of blood,” if civil war were to ensue) and that thousands of civilians would perish at the hands of Qaddafi's retaliatory revenge against the uprisings. In last Monday’s speech, President Obama said:
"We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi – a city nearly the size of Charlotte – could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen."
The case isn't as strong as Samantha Power, et al, would have you presume. This is not an intervention to prevent genocide, or violence on some comparable level. Invariably, it is difficult for us to judge the true merits for war given that the word 'humanitarian,' itself, is vague. Is there a threshold of deaths needed for the 'humanitarian disaster' label? The Blaine Truth argued last month that the case was clear - the United States must protect the rebels and aid them in their overthrow of Qaddafi. This goes beyond the stated scope of the UN Security Council Resolution. In a previous post, I stated what the difficulties were with such a limited scope, but nonetheless they were necessary to build a coalition.
Although we may not like Qaddafi, although we may not want him to be in power, we are limited by the wording of the resolution - as Dr. Cordesman highlights - which is a consensus piece and not itself a diver of policy. Nevertheless, it is the basis for justification of intervention. Ultimately, what is important and what Stephen Walt highlighted is that President Obama's speech "did not matter," it is the results of the No-Fly Zone that matter. The justifications for intervention can change with time (as witnessed in Iraq), but there is only one clear rendering of the results, which remain to be seen.
References:
Marc Lynch’s article:
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/29/the_case_against_the_libya_intervention
Stephen Walt’s article:
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/29/why_obamas_libya_speech_didnt_matter
http://csis.org/multimedia/video-anthony-cordesman-unrest-libya
Very interesting post. Basing our efforts on humanitarian principles is a very risky proposition. Some cases in history have been clear as you pointed out, but with the region in similar turmoil yet all with different details, finding ways to distinguish them will be difficult and at times arbitrary. We have to develop a strong sense of when and how to aid these countries as these situations continue to come up during this so-called "Arab Spring".
ReplyDeleteInevitably, larger countries such as Iran will fall into turmoil again and we need to be prepared with a response.
Last week I read an interesting article by Lisa Anderson, President of the American University in Cairo, in Foreign Affairs, entitled, "Demystifying the Arab Spring." In it, she goes into detail why each of the three prominent revolutions - Egypt, Libya, Tunisia - is different, and hence merit a different response. I do not see the utility in leading a crusade against Qaddafi on so-called humanitarian efforts, while not have that same crusading efforts as a response to similar situations.
ReplyDeleteNow, if we constructed our cause for war on non-humanitarian grounds; i.e. with more nuanced reasoning, then that cause could be held up for scrutiny on its merits. What we saw last weekend with the attempted bombing of Qaddafi's compound, is an egregious over-step of the consensus reached by the UN security council. Now, if we had a different source of legitimacy - the need to remove Qaddafi, as opposed to the need to defend civilians - we could arm the rebels, step-up our bombing campaign and target Qaddafi and his family, specifically. But since we don't, we are left with a half-hearted effort. Hence, why two months later, nothing has changed.
I am not defending more entrenched efforts, or the invasion itself, it just seems prudent to not limit your options in a violent effort if your goal is the same regardless. The most important lesson from Serbia in all of this, is that Milosevic only stepped down after he was no longer Russia's client. We need to find the same breaking point for Qaddafi now that we are in Libya. There is no sense in arguing over the legitimacy of the cause at this point.
As per Iran, I do not know what you are hinting at.