In the debate over how to respond to Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi's retrenchment of power against rebel forces in Libya, US foreign policy decision-makers should apply the spirit of Paul Newman's words concerning poker in Cool Hand Luke, "Sometimes nothing can be a real cool hand."
The United Kingdom, France, the Arab League and Senators John McCain and John Kerry have all called for the creation of a No Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya. The diversity of humanitarian deterrence proponents should not be a basis for the justification of the creation of a NFZ.
The only certainty in Libya is the apparent uncertainty of the turmoil.
We do not know who controls the Libyan rebel movement, beyond the confines of the National Transitional Council. Provisional councils have been established, but it would be shortsighted to assume control or influence of any one group, tribe or political affiliation over the rebel movement.
Neither are we entirely sure of the motivations of all those involved in these movements. Are their grievances economic, social, religious or political? Or, are individuals taking advantage of a power vacuum, or perceived power vacuum in Libyan politics? It is difficult to judge the motivations of those who defected from Qaddafi's military so quickly. Could they re-align with the regime if the rebel movement proves unsuccessful?
Then, there is the growing realization that the struggle between the Qaddafi regime, the pro-Qaddafi forces and African mercenaries on the one hand and the Free Libya rebel movement, the National Transitional Council and Qaddafi defectors on the other hand is defined on regional, territorial and tribal lines. These geographical and familiar delineations put pressures on the foundations of advocates of “humanitarian intervention.” Effectively, the United States and the International Community would no longer be defending helpless Libyan civilians, but picking sides in a Civil War.
In fact, Libya today resembles more Colonial Libya than the modern state of Libya. Essentially, the country is starting to split, if it hasn’t already, between Benghazi and Tripoli. Benghazi was previously the capital of Cyrenaica, an Italian colonial administration that spanned the eastern part of modern-day Libya. Tripoli was the capital of the Italian Tripolitania. These administrations remained separate until merged together with Fezzan to form what we know today as Libya.
This deconstruction of the arbitrary Italian 1934 borders by the National Transitional Council poses questions not only to the system of boundaries with which we operate in the Middle East today, but attachment of the United States and other Western allies have to these nominal borders.
The paradox then is whether to solve problems in part created by the Italian colonization in Libya (empowering and preferring Benghazi vis-a-vis Tripoli) with further “colonization.” In other words, does the United States solve the Libyan crisis with NFZ’s, Special Op’s and targeted strikes? Does the United States follow the Italian example and empower one side of the country over another? Or, does the United States follow in Paul Newman’s example and play the only “real cool hand” they have (and do "nothing")?
Doing nothing, in this sense, does not have to be doing nothing in the strictest definition of the action. Doing nothing can certainly involve moving against Qaddafi's assets and isolating him internationally. Both actions are strong measures, which invariably cost the United States very little.
The complexity of the situation in Libya is compounded by the obscurity of American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East following the ouster of President Ben Ali from Tunisia earlier this year. The inability to either commit to regional autocrats or support regime change outright has left the United States without the tactical credibility to be taken seriously by regional and international powers. When President Barack Obama calls Qaddafi to “leave immediately,” but does not implement a program to provide aid for his ouster, Qaddafi feels emboldened to stay.
Thus, while the United States moves to find long-term responses to the Arab Spring, let us not be tempted to give answers to questions we don't know all the facts about. The United States has been dealt a difficult situation in Libya: a tenuous rebel alliance, with a poor central command structure and differing incentives. With this "hand," it may be difficult to justify going all-in (military intervention, i.e. Afghanistan) or raising the bet knowing the cards at hand (NFZ, i.e. Iraq 1991), but doing nothing, although unattractive in the press, provides the most measured response and in this case can be a "real cool hand."
You hit the nail on the head at the end there--the reason the US is concerned about playing the cool hand is fear of a press backlash. I find it very bizarre that American foreign policy decision makers seem to consider the opinion of our domestic media a more important opinion than, say, the population of the affected state or what history shows us to be nearly inevitable. The majority of the time, US involvement in the foreign civil affairs goes south very quickly and American good intentions end up being resented and attacked by the people they supposedly help. Do we really want to add Libya, or any state for that matter, as we aren't really in the position to be anyone's savior right now, to our long list of failed foreign interventions? Obviously not, but people in Washington seem to scared of our own commentators accusing them of turning a blind eye to tragedy to just do the smart thing and sit this one out.
ReplyDeleteAnd on a semi-unrelated note, I love the lead in on this one. Any chance to effectively reference Paul Newman should be seized.
The White House Press Corps expects an official response by a member of the administration within minutes of a pressing event internationally, or domestically for that matter. Our foreign policy decision making, as with our domestic policy, is orchestrated in the Op-Ed pages of the New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. With Libya, the question no longer was - Should we be involved? The question was - How and when should we get involved?
ReplyDeleteAs a decision maker, when you do not act, you are criticized for doing so. When you do act, you are also criticized. Decision makers in general and the Obama Administration need to realized that they are not in the business of appeasing the public, public opinion or the press. They are in the business of governing, which in itself is making consensus decisions with limited information, time and money.
It is nice to be vindicated by the turn of events, two months into the campaign there has been no change of government in Tripoli. We have an effective stalemate that could turn into a proactive civil war. Hundreds of NATO sorties have not changed the basic balance of power on the ground.
This is not to say that Qaddafi was not a terrible human being. The Battle of Misruta was especially gruesome. Qaddafi's forces certainly didn't aid their PR by hiding behind civilians and sniping indiscriminately throughout the town.
In the end, we were certainly late in responding; half-hearted in doing so, quick to "handover" responsibility, inept in aiding the rebels - via arms, cover, or defense, and unable to get rid of Qaddafi or change the tide.
We can only hope for the best now.