Libya Cartoon

My apparent "Marc Lynch"

To any of you who have read my last two blog posts. You may be confused. For I, apparently, have pulled a "Marc Lynch," which in this case goes from overtly supporting intervention in Libya to taking a more measured stance on the situation. For Marc Lynch, this shift is witnessed on his blog for Foreign Policy, Abu Aardvark's Middle East Blog, from this post to this post. It is only right that I concede that I too have made an ideological shift to a more tempered response. Given that since my last post, the United Nations Security Council has voted in favor of a No Fly Zone or a No Drive Zone, depending on how you define, I now must defend my shift away from liberal interventionism.

I will admit, as Stephen Walt contends, there are many similarities to the decision-making process that I underwent and the "gut instincts" aspects of decision-making under the George W. Bush Administration. Initially, I was angry at Col. Muammar al-Qaddaffi's brutal retaliation against the Libyan Rebel Forces and I hoped on the interventionist bandwagon. I, myself, am quite surprised by quick shift in the ideological stalemate in the Obama Administration towards intervention. The cool response, I advocated for, in my last post, was not headed.


Now that I have apologized for my ideological shift. I will go on to further justify why I made the shift away from intervention through the words of Stephen Walt:

More importantly, despite Obama's declaration that he would not send ground troops into Libya -- a statement made to assuage an overcommitted military, reassure a skeptical public, or both -- what is he going to do if the air assault doesn't work? What if Qaddafi hangs tough, which would hardly be surprising given the dearth of attractive alternatives that he's facing? What if his supporters see this as another case of illegitimate Western interferences, and continue to back him? What if he moves forces back into the cities he controls, blends them in with the local population, and dares us to bomb civilians? Will the United States and its allies continue to pummel Libya until he says uncle? Or will Obama and Sarkozy and Cameron then decide that now it's time for special forces, or even ground troops?  

And even if we are successful, what then? As in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, over forty years of Qaddafi's erratic and despotic rule have left Libya in very poor shape despite its oil wealth. Apart from some potentially fractious tribes, the country is almost completely lacking in effective national institutions. If Qaddafi goes we will own the place, and we will probably have to do something substantial to rebuild it lest it turn into an exporter of refugees, a breeding ground for criminals, or the sort of terrorist "safe haven" we're supposedly trying to prevent in Afghanistan.

Sometimes nothing can be a real cool hand

In the debate over how to respond to Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi's retrenchment of power against rebel forces in Libya, US foreign policy decision-makers should apply the spirit of Paul Newman's words concerning poker in Cool Hand Luke, "Sometimes nothing can be a real cool hand."

The United Kingdom, France, the Arab League and Senators John McCain and John Kerry have all called for the creation of a No Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya. The diversity of humanitarian deterrence proponents should not be a basis for the justification of the creation of a NFZ.

The only certainty in Libya is the apparent uncertainty of the turmoil.

We do not know who controls the Libyan rebel movement, beyond the confines of the National Transitional Council. Provisional councils have been established, but it would be shortsighted to assume control or influence of any one group, tribe or political affiliation over the rebel movement. 

Neither are we entirely sure of the motivations of all those involved in these movements. Are their grievances economic, social, religious or political? Or, are individuals taking advantage of a power vacuum, or perceived power vacuum in Libyan politics? It is difficult to judge the motivations of those who defected from Qaddafi's military so quickly. Could they re-align with the regime if the rebel movement proves unsuccessful?

Then, there is the growing realization that the struggle between the Qaddafi regime, the pro-Qaddafi forces and African mercenaries on the one hand and the Free Libya rebel movement, the National Transitional Council and Qaddafi defectors on the other hand is defined on regional, territorial and tribal lines. These geographical and familiar delineations put pressures on the foundations of advocates of “humanitarian intervention.” Effectively, the United States and the International Community would no longer be defending helpless Libyan civilians, but picking sides in a Civil War.

In fact, Libya today resembles more Colonial Libya than the modern state of Libya. Essentially, the country is starting to split, if it hasn’t already, between Benghazi and Tripoli. Benghazi was previously the capital of Cyrenaica, an Italian colonial administration that spanned the eastern part of modern-day Libya. Tripoli was the capital of the Italian Tripolitania. These administrations remained separate until merged together with Fezzan to form what we know today as Libya. 

This deconstruction of the arbitrary Italian 1934 borders by the National Transitional Council poses questions not only to the system of boundaries with which we operate in the Middle East today, but attachment of the United States and other Western allies have to these nominal borders.

The paradox then is whether to solve problems in part created by the Italian colonization in Libya (empowering and preferring Benghazi vis-a-vis Tripoli) with further “colonization.” In other words, does the United States solve the Libyan crisis with NFZ’s, Special Op’s and targeted strikes? Does the United States follow the Italian example and empower one side of the country over another? Or, does the United States follow in Paul Newman’s example and play the only “real cool hand” they have (and do "nothing")?

Doing nothing, in this sense, does not have to be doing nothing in the strictest definition of the action. Doing nothing can certainly involve moving against Qaddafi's assets and isolating him internationally. Both actions are strong measures, which invariably cost the United States very little.

The complexity of the situation in Libya is compounded by the obscurity of American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East following the ouster of President Ben Ali from Tunisia earlier this year. The inability to either commit to regional autocrats or support regime change outright has left the United States without the tactical credibility to be taken seriously by regional and international powers. When President Barack Obama calls Qaddafi to “leave immediately,” but does not implement a program to provide aid for his ouster, Qaddafi feels emboldened to stay.

Thus, while the United States moves to find long-term responses to the Arab Spring, let us not be tempted to give answers to questions we don't know all the facts about. The United States has been dealt a difficult situation in Libya: a tenuous rebel alliance, with a poor central command structure and differing incentives. With this "hand," it may be difficult to justify going all-in (military intervention, i.e. Afghanistan) or raising the bet knowing the cards at hand (NFZ, i.e. Iraq 1991), but doing nothing, although unattractive in the press, provides the most measured response and in this case can be a "real cool hand."